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I. 
 The International Longshoremen’s Association 
challenges the District Court’s order denying its motion for 
relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).  The 
Union argues that the Court mistakenly classified Eddie 
Knight as a prevailing party and wrongly awarded him 
attorney’s fees in the amount of $243,758.34, including costs 
and post-judgment fees.  The Union also questions whether 
the District Court even had jurisdiction to make the award, 
claiming it did more than our mandate authorized it to do in 
the Union’s prior appeal.  We will affirm.  
  
II 
 This case has been around since 2001 and this is the 
third appeal we have heard from these parties.1  Knight is a 
member of the International Longshoremen’s Association, 
Local 1694, and was financial secretary for the Local.  In 
2000, he distributed a flier that said the Local was hosting a 
group known as the Worker’s Coalition.  Adam McBride, 
executive director of the Diamond State Port Corporation 
(created by the State of Delaware to operate the Port of 
Wilmington where members of Local 1694 work) saw the 
flier Knight distributed and offered to be a speaker.  McBride 
also contributed $500—paying it directly to the hotel where 
the meeting was happening.  
                                              
1 See Knight v. International Longshoremen’s Association, 
457 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006); Knight v. International 
Longshoremen’s Association, 527 Fed. App’x. 187 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
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 Shortly after McBride did these things, the Union’s 
national vice president, James Paylor, called McBride and 
told him that the Worker’s Coalition was not affiliated with 
the Union.  McBride withdrew his offer to be a speaker, but 
he did not ask for the $500 to be returned.   
 
 Knight filed Union charges against Paylor for 
interfering with the Local.  Paylor counter-charged Knight.  
He accused him of making frivolous claims that were 
detrimental to the Union.  He also said that Knight used the 
Union name without permission, violating Article XXVII of 
the Union constitution.  The Union put together a board to 
hear the charges.  The hearing board cleared Paylor, but 
decided that Knight committed three violations:  he misled 
the executive director of the Corporation to believe that the 
Union endorsed the Worker’s Coalition; he violated Section 
302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 
§186(b)) by accepting a gift from an employer; and, he used 
the Union and Local name, without permission, to solicit 
funds from an employer.  It recommended that the Union’s 
Executive Council suspend Knight and order him, personally, 
to repay the $500 given by Diamond State Port Corporation.  
The Executive Council adopted the recommendations.   
 
 Knight filed suit, claiming that Article XXVII of the 
Union’s constitution—prohibiting use of its name—violated 
his free speech rights.  He also asserted against the Union 
three claims under the Labor Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. § 411).  Specifically, he alleged 
that the Union:  refused to allow him to record his 
disciplinary hearing; selected a biased union member to serve 
on the board; and failed to give union members proper notice 
about the Act, violating Section 105.  The District Court 
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abstained on the free speech issue and ruled against Knight on 
the due process claims.   
   
 We reversed the District Court’s order in 2006 and 
remanded the case.  We ruled that the District Court should 
not have abstained, and decided that Article XXVII was too 
broad, chilling the free speech rights of union members under 
the Labor Management Relations Act.  The remand instructed 
the District Court to consider changing Article XXVII of the 
Union’s constitution to apply more narrowly to the misuse of 
the Union name.  We also reversed the District Court’s order 
on all of Knight’s other claims, ruling that the Union violated 
due process under the Labor Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act:  by refusing his request to record the hearing; 
by failing to give him an impartial disciplinary hearing 
committee; and, by failing to properly inform its members 
about the Act.  Our remand instructed the District Court to 
determine the appropriate remedy for Knight.  Later, in a 
separate order, we awarded attorney’s fees to Knight in the 
amount of $64,285. 
 
 Following our remand, the District Court ordered the 
Union to revise Article XXVII and to create a new policy for 
distributing copies of summaries of the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act.  The District Court also 
ordered the Union to give Knight a new hearing with an 
impartial tribunal, and to allow Knight to record the hearing.  
The Union complied with the order on the due process issues 
regarding bias and a tape-recorded record, and with 
improving its efforts to distribute information about the Act.  
It did not, however, immediately fulfill the requirements of 
the order to change its constitution.   
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 Before the Union’s ethics officer (who was accepted 
by both parties as unbiased) the Union asked for a ruling that 
Knight should be disciplined under Article XVIII of the 
Union constitution for conduct detrimental to the welfare of 
the Union by violating Section 302(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act.  The hearing was recorded, and 
the ethics officer of the Union presided.  The officer decided 
that Knight did not “technically” violate section 302(a) 
because the Corporation who gave the $500 did not fit the 
definition of an employer under that section.  But, the officer 
went on to conclude that, at the time of the first hearing, it 
was reasonable for the Union to decide that Knight “violated 
the spirit and intent of §302(b) and to direct the return of the 
money.”  
  
 Knight and the Union then filed summary judgment 
motions with the District Court.  The District Court denied 
most of the parties’ claims, but it did order a hearing on 
Knight’s assertion that the Union never charged him with 
violating the spirit of section 302(b), infringing his due 
process right under section 101(a)(5) of the Act.  It also 
instructed the parties to present evidence regarding Knight’s 
request for compensatory and punitive damages.2  The 
District Court decided that the Union violated Knight’s due 
process rights because it did not give him adequate notice of 
the misconduct for which he was found guilty.  It also ruled 
that Knight was entitled to be reimbursed $500 for the fine 
that he paid to the Union (and post-judgment interest on that 
amount).  However, it concluded that he did not present 
                                              
2 The District Court also compelled the Union to comply with 
its earlier order to amend the constitution.  
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enough evidence to justify either compensatory damages for 
lost income or punitive damages.3   
 
 Shortly after the District Court entered this order, 
Knight filed motions to set aside the judgment, to alter the 
judgment for prejudgment interest, and to recover attorney’s 
fees and costs.  Knight then appealed the order on the issue of 
damages.  The Union cross-appealed the District Court’s 
order, arguing that it did not violate Knight’s due process 
rights.  We stayed the appeal and cross-appeal while the 
District Court decided the post-judgment motions.   
 
 The District Court eventually granted Knight’s motion 
for attorney’s fees and costs, awarding him $295,971.87 in 
fees and costs.  Citing to Ruocchio v. United Transp. Union, 
181 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1999), it concluded that Knight 
was a prevailing party who conferred a common benefit to all 
union members because of his successful free speech and due 
process challenges.  The Union conceded that Knight’s 
successful free speech and section 105 claims conferred a 
common benefit.  The District Court concluded that the 
required changes to the disciplinary hearing also conferred a 
common benefit because they would encourage the Union to 
pay more attention to procedural fairness in hearings that 
would follow, and make members aware of their due process 
rights.  It denied the rest of Knight’s post-judgment motions.   
 
 The Union amended its appeal in light of the attorney’s 
fees and costs awards, preserving this issue, but neither party 
                                              
3 The District Court invited Knight to file a motion and brief 
for prejudgment interest, but entered the final order before he 
was able to do so.   
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briefed it and we did not address it.  In our 2013 decision, we 
agreed with the Union that Knight’s due process rights under 
section 101(a)(5) of the Act were not violated in the second 
hearing, and we disagreed with Knight that damages should 
be awarded.  Before we issued our mandate, Knight filed a 
motion with the District Court to require the surety to pay 
attorney’s fees.  In the alternative, Knight wanted the District 
Court to order the Union to continue the supersedeas bond 
they posted, or to put up a substitute bond in an amount to 
cover Knight’s attorney’s fees award.  The Union filed for 
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, arguing that Knight no longer was a 
prevailing party and could not claim attorney’s fees.  The 
District Court denied the Union’s motion for relief and 
ultimately awarded Knight attorney’s fees, costs, and post-
judgment interest.  It based the award on its conclusion that, 
because of Knight’s suit, Knight and other Union members:  
can no longer be disciplined for making harmless references 
to the Union name or logo; are more aware of certain due 
process rights at disciplinary hearings; and, are properly 
informed about the Act.  It adjusted the amount of the 
judgment downward to $243,758.34, in part to account for 
our reversal on Knight’s due process claim in the second 
round.  The Union now appeals the denial of their motion for 
relief. 
 
III. 
 The Union first says that our order in 2013 remanded 
the case to the District Court to do only one thing:  vacate the 
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award of damages.4  They maintain that the District Court did 
not have authority to do anything else.  This is incorrect. 5 
 
 There is no question that the District Court was 
required to follow our mandate (Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985));  
but, there is no basis here for the Union to say that the District 
Court acted improperly.  “On remand, a trial court is free ‘to 
make any order or direction in further progress of the case, 
not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court, as to 
any question not settled by the decision.’”  Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Bankers Trust Co., 761 F.2d at 950).  
Knight’s appeal focused on the District Court’s damages 
ruling.  The Union’s cross appeal challenged the District 
Court’s ruling that the second disciplinary hearing violated 
due process under section 101(a)(5) of the Act.  These are the 
issues we decided.  It is true that the Union amended their 
cross appeal to add the District Court’s later award of 
attorney’s fees.6  However, as we said, no one briefed the 
issue and we did not rule on it.  Therefore, our mandate did 
not prevent the District Court from deciding Knight’s post-
appeal motions on the supersedeas bond and attorney’s fees, 
                                              
4 Our appellate jurisdiction in this case is based upon 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
5 We review this question de novo.  United States v. Kennedy, 
682 F.3d 244, 253 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction to rule on attorney’s fees 
while the appeal was pending.  See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 
117, 120 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1985).   
10 
 
and the Union’s motion for relief.  The District Court had 
jurisdiction to decide these motions.   
 
 The Union’s second claim is that the District Court 
wrongly denied its Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from 
judgment.  The Rule says the following: 
 
On motion and just terms, the 
court may relieve a party or its 
legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: . . . (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, 
released or discharged; it is based 
on an earlier judgment that has 
been reversed or vacated; or 
applying it prospectively is no 
longer equitable. . . .  
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).  We have plenary review over the 
District Court’s interpretation and application of legal rules 
and doctrines.  Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 
403, 405-406 (3d Cir. 2003).  Every other aspect of the 
District Court’s decision to deny the motion is examined for 
an abuse of discretion.  Wilson v. Fenton, 684 F.2d 249, 
251 (3d Cir. 1982).  Our scope of review is narrow; we do not 
examine the underlying judgment.  Id. 
 
 The Union has the burden of convincing us that the 
District Court misinterpreted the legal definition of prevailing 
party here and that, because of this misunderstanding, it relied 
on the wrong facts to decide its motion.  Their argument, 
essentially, is that the District Court should have focused on 
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the relief that we gave the Union in 2013 and should have 
minimized or ignored the judgment in Knight’s favor that we 
filed in 2006.  
 
 The Union says that, without a final judgment in his 
favor, Knight is no longer a prevailing party.  Concentrating 
on his underlying motive for the lawsuit (reversing the 
Union’s discipline against him) as the centerpiece of any 
determination on his success in this lawsuit, they say Knight 
lost the battle:  his suspension was not revoked and his fine 
was not reduced.  Mirroring language in Supreme Court 
precedent on attorney’s fees, they contend that “the Court has 
not issued an enforceable judgment against Defendant ILA on 
Plaintiff Knight’s [Labor Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act] § 101 Claim.  The legal relationship between 
Knight and the [Union] was not altered.”  See Buckhannon 
Bd. & Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001).   
 
 There is truth in what the Union is saying.  Our ruling 
on Knight’s second appeal ended his due process challenge.  
This wiped out his entitlement to any damages, and it 
eliminated anyone’s credible belief that flaws in the Union’s 
disciplinary process were affecting the outcome of the 
hearing.  However, the Union is convinced that the District 
Court lost sight of all of this and analyzed the prevailing party 
issue in a way that contradicts Buckhannon’s ruling.  It went 
astray, they claim, by relying on the order we issued in 2006 
(granting Knight relief on his due process and free speech 
claims) rather than focusing exclusively on the final judgment 
in its favor.  We disagree.  The Union approaches this 
argument from different perspectives, and we will examine 
each. 
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 The Union underscores the fact that Knight did not 
receive any damages in this case.  Citing to Rhodes v. 
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988), it insists that a party who is not 
awarded damages cannot “prevail.”  Rhodes does not really 
say this; but, be that as it may, the Union’s position does not 
account for the effect that the common benefit doctrine has 
here.  Although Title I of the Labor Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act does not provide an award of attorney’s 
fees, it is settled law that union members who successfully 
vindicate rights under Title I of the Act can seek 
reimbursement under the common benefit doctrine.  Pawlak 
v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 975 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Hall 
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1973)).  The doctrine applies when 
“the plaintiff’s successful litigation confers ‘a substantial 
benefit on the members of an ascertainable class.’”  Id.  
(quoting Hall, 412 U.S. at 5).   
 
 Before Hall, the Supreme Court had already brushed 
aside concerns about damage awards when it considered the 
issue of attorney’s fees under the common benefit doctrine.  
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).  “The 
fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never 
produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be 
paid does not preclude an award. . . .”  Id. at 392.  The Court 
concentrated on the “stare decisis effect” of the case upon 
future suits that could arise from the newly created precedent.  
Id. at 393.  It also credited the judgment resulting from the 
suit as “vindicating the statutory policy” by contributing to a 
fair and informed voting process for the shareholders.   Id. at 
396.  Notwithstanding all of this, the Supreme Court set a 
substantial threshold for judging a party as successful under 
this doctrine.  Quoting the Minnesota Supreme Court, it 
cautioned that the common benefit “must be something more 
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than technical in its consequence and be one that 
accomplishes a result that corrects or prevents an abuse which 
would be prejudicial to the rights and interests [of the 
beneficiaries] or affect the enjoyment or protection of an 
essential right [of the beneficiaries].”  Id. (quoting Bosch v. 
Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Assn., 101 N.W. 2d 423, 
427 (Minn. 1960)).   
 
 “Success” in lawsuits is a slippery concept that can 
shift between the parties as different phases of the case 
unfold.  Courts always must be cautious to avoid authorizing 
attorney’s fees where a party has  “won a battle but lost the 
war.”  National Amusements, Inc., v. Borough of Palmyra, 
716 F. 3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal brackets omitted).   
That concern is at the heart of our review here.  We 
understand the fact that Knight launched this lawsuit because 
he wanted to reverse the Union’s decision to fine and suspend 
him and that, ultimately, this did not happen.  But, his 
complaint, which provides a fair basis for figuring out what 
the legal “war” was about, pointed to problems that could not 
be fixed with money damages.  It is important to us that, 
citing to the Act, the focus of Knight’s lawsuit was on 
challenging the validity of the process used to discipline him.  
It is also matters that his suit claimed problems that were not 
merely technical or incidental mistakes in the process as it 
applied to him.  By claiming that the Union’s constitution 
infringed his free speech rights, and that basic elements of the 
Union’s disciplinary process violated his due process rights, 
he raised larger issues about structural elements of his 
disciplinary process.  All of this gave the District Court good 
reason—consistent with Mills and Pawlak—to look beyond 
the absence of monetary damages in the final judgment to 
figure out if Knight’s lawsuit was successful.    
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 The Union goes further, though, arguing that the 
District Court’s opinion mistakenly relied on our judgment in 
2006 and ignored or contradicted the final judgment in this 
case.  They make three related arguments to support this idea:  
(1) the 2006 order granting relief was an interim order; (2)  
the relief that Knight got in 2006 was only a remand for a 
new hearing; and (3) our order in 2013 reversed all prior 
orders that supported any claim that Knight prevailed.    
 
 The Union’s argument that attorney’s fees cannot arise 
from an interim order begins with a point that we accept.  The 
Union is correct that the order we issued in 2006 contained a 
remand that precluded its finality.7   However, the District 
                                              
7 The Restatement of Judgments says the following: 
 
Finality will be lacking if an issue 
of law or fact essential to the 
adjudication of the claim has been 
reserved for future determination, 
or if the court has decided that the 
plaintiff should have relief against 
the defendant of the claim but the 
amount of the damages, or the 
form or scope of other relief, 
remains to be determined. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13(b) (1982).  “An 
order that establishes liability but leaves open the question of 
damages or other remedies ... [is] not final for purposes of 
preclusion under traditional analysis.” 18A Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
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Court ordered attorney’s fees in this case after a final 
judgment had been rendered.  It did rely on unchallenged 
rulings from a non-final order, but it did so only after all 
issues in the case had been resolved.8   
 
 The Union is also right when it says, citing to the 
Supreme Court, that a party’s victory on an interim 
(interlocutory) order is often not enough to claim entitlement 
to attorney’s fees.  Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 759 
(1980).  Yet, they go too far when they say that an interim 
order can never ground attorney’s fees.  The Court in 
Hanrahan, ruling in a civil rights case, said:  “It seems 
apparent . . . that Congress intended to permit the interim 
award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the 
merits of at least some of his claims.”  Id. at 757-8.  It 
clarified this statement, saying:  ‘“[T]he entry of any order 
that determines substantial rights of the parties may be an 
appropriate occasion upon which to consider the propriety of 
an award of counsel fees.’”  Id.  at 757 (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976)).  Therefore, even were we to say 
that the attorney’s fees in this case were awarded on an 
interim order—an assertion with which we disagree—that 
alone would not be enough to reverse the District Court’s 
decision here.   
 
 The Union moves on to the substance of our 2006 
order, saying that it was essentially a remand for a new 
hearing.  They cite to a string of cases where we and other 
                                                                                                     
Practice and Procedure § 4432 (2d ed. 2002) (citing G. & C. 
Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28, 29 (1916)).   
 
8 See infra pp. 15-16.  
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courts have decided that a remand for a new trial is not a 
victory that counts as having “prevailed.”   See, e.g., Clark v. 
Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 1989).  Again, 
there is a kernel of truth in the Union’s argument.  In many 
cases where a court of appeals remands for a new trial, the 
remand puts the plaintiff  “no closer to a verdict in her favor 
than she was before the trial first began.”  Swietlowich v. 
Bucks County, 620 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1980) (remand for 
new trial due to errors in jury instruction).   As the Supreme 
Court said so elegantly, such victories are “ephemeral.”  Sole 
v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 76 (2007) (plaintiff won a preliminary 
injunction but ultimately lost on merits of claim).  But, none 
of that really matters here because—as we suspect the Union 
is well aware—our order in 2006 did not remand for a new 
trial.   
 
 Our ruling in 2006 gave Knight a final decision in his 
favor on every claim he raised in his complaint.  Our Opinion 
suggested to the District Court some courses of action for 
implementing our order, but the remand ultimately gave the 
District Court discretion to figure out the best way to remedy 
the due process and free speech violations.  The District Court 
used this discretion to order the Union to change its 
constitution, to implement new procedures at its disciplinary 
hearing, and to come up with a better way of distributing to 
union members information about the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act.  It also decided that, with these 
changes, Knight was entitled to a new disciplinary hearing.  
We never directed the District Court to do this, nor would it 
have really mattered if we did.  As suggested in Hanrahan, 
the key issue here is whether the order determined substantial 
rights of the parties.  Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 757.  The issue 
before us in 2006 was whether the Union respected Knight’s 
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rights and complied with the Act when it disciplined him, not 
whether the Union’s decision to discipline him was right or 
wrong.9  Our order, and the District Court’s order on remand, 
did not return Knight to “square-one.”  His lawsuit 
succeeded:  he received a judgment stating that the Union 
breached important rights, and he obtained orders compelling 
the Union to change its constitution and its procedures.10    
 
 This leads us to the Union’s final argument:  that our 
order in 2013 reversed any possible basis for Knight to claim 
that he was a prevailing party.  Our conclusion on this issue is 
very simple.  There is no credible way of validating the 
Union’s argument that our holding in 2013 reversed our 
ruling in 2006.  Our decision in 2013, rejecting Knight’s new 
                                              
9 In fact, we had a clear-eyed view of the possibility that, if 
given a new hearing, Knight might still face discipline.  See 
Knight v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 457 F.3d at 340 
(“Because we do not have a transcript of the hearing we do 
not know the basis for the committee to have characterized 
Knight's receipt of the donation from Adam McBride 
(admittedly improper under the statute) as a ‘solicitation.’”).   
 
10 The Union also likens the District Court’s orders, 
implementing our 2006 judgment, to preliminary injunctions.  
However, this description makes no sense because the orders 
did not provide prospective relief.  Sypniewski v. Warren 
Hills Regional Board of Education, 307 F.3d 243, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  The District Court ordered permanent changes to 
the Union’s procedures and its constitution, consistent with 
our conclusions about the Union’s violations of due process 
and free speech rights.  
 
18 
 
challenges to the fairness of the second hearing did nothing to 
affect our holding about the problems arising from the first 
hearing.  Our holding in 2006 was never appealed by the 
Union, and has remained undisturbed through the remainder 
of this case.   Our order in 2013 did reverse the District 
Court’s order, but that reversal was limited to the District 
Court’s conclusions about a due process violation in the 
second hearing and Knight’s entitlement to damages.  We did 
not touch the issue of attorney’s fees or the underlying issue 
of who prevailed in this case.  Therefore, we are not 
persuaded by the Union’s argument that the District Court’s 
decision to deny the Union’s motion for relief under Rule 60 
contradicted or ignored our final judgment in this case.   
 
 For these reasons, we hold that the District Court did 
not err in its understanding and application of the legal 
concept of  “prevailing party” under the common benefit 
doctrine to the Union’s motion.  The Union’s request for 
relief was entirely based on its claim that our decision in 2013 
took away Knight’s status as a prevailing party.  The District 
Court asked the proper legal question under the common 
benefit doctrine to decide this motion:  did Knight 
successfully vindicate rights under Title I of the Act?  To 
answer that question, it was necessary for the District Court to 
examine the entire case, including our uncontested rulings 
from 2006. 
 
 We next turn to the District Court’s application of the 
facts to the legal standard.  As we have just noted, the 
common benefit doctrine required the District Court to ask 
whether, at the end of the day, Knight vindicated Title I rights 
in a way that was significant to the union members at-large.  
Framed in this way, we conclude that the District Court did 
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not abuse its discretion by basing its decision on Knight’s 
victories in 2006, rather than his defeat in 2013.   
 
 Again, the Union presses us to place Knight’s motives 
for bringing the lawsuit at the center of any decision about 
whether he prevailed.  However, in Pawlak, we separated the 
union members’ personal motives for challenging the union 
on free speech issues (and the ultimate electoral defeat of the 
by-laws they championed) from the benefit that was given to 
union membership by the suit.  We concluded that the suit, 
resulting in a consent order, vindicated their freedom of 
speech, ‘“dispelled the ‘chill’ cast upon the rights of all Union 
members and contributed to the preservation of union 
democracy.”  Pawlak, 713 F.2d at 980.  We reasoned that the 
consent order “contributed to a fair process in bylaws 
referenda . . . . for it now stands as precedent for subsequent 
bylaws referenda.”  Id.  Similarly, we do not agree with the 
Union that a union member’s lack of success in overturning 
his discipline must wipe out the possibility that union 
members at-large benefited from changes he won in the 
union’s disciplinary procedures earlier in the litigation.  It 
was appropriate for the District Court to weigh the impact of 
the uncontested rulings we made in 2006 to analyze whether 
Knight’s case had a significant “stare decisis effect.” 11 
                                              
11 We note that it was particularly proper here where the Act 
authorizing Knight’s causes of action was designed to foster 
the “full and active participation by the rank and file in the 
affairs of the union.”  Id.  at 975 (quoting Hall, 412 U.S. at 7-
8).  Though the District Court did not discuss the claims in 
these terms, it is legitimate, under common benefit analysis, 
to assess whether the suit “vindicate[ed] statutory policy.”  
Mills, 396 U.S. at 396.   
20 
 
 All of this leads us to conclude that the District Court 
did not commit any errors by considering the impact of 
Knight’s due process and free speech successes from the first 
hearing.  This was plainly relevant to the question raised by 
the Union in its motion:  whether Knight could still be 
regarded as a prevailing party.  It adjusted downward the fees 
associated with Knight’s claims arising from the second 
disciplinary hearing, but left intact the remainder of the 
award.  All of this was well within the discretion of the 
District Court.   
 
 For all of these reasons, we will hold that the District 
Court exercised sound judgment and acted within its 
discretion when it denied the Union’s motion for relief from 
judgment.     
